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Through its enlargements and the launching of the Eastern Partnership the European 
Union (EU) approached Russia’s so-called near abroad. The shared neighbourhood is 
spotted with ‘de facto states’ such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Donetsk and Luhansk, which proclaimed independence from their 
‘mother states’: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine respectively. In the 
absence of international recognition, however, these self-proclaimed republics 
depend on the support of their patrons: Russia and, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Armenia. This translates into particular legal implications for those regions: while they 
are formally perceived to remain integral parts of their mother states, the latter do not 
exercise an effective control there. Since the EU is tightening its bonds with the Eastern 
Partnership countries, the question arises how it engages with these de facto states. 
The EU’s interaction with the ‘unrecognised states’ in the Eastern Partnership is shaped 
by both international and EU law. While Brussels respects the international legal 
framework limiting its engagement (e.g. the obligation to respect the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the mother states or the lack of competence to grant 
recognition or establish diplomatic relations), it has found pragmatic ways to interact 
with the de facto states. The Union addresses those self-proclaimed republics by 
shaping the recognition practices of its member states, by enabling the EU 
Delegations and Special Representatives to have contacts with the de facto 
authorities, by highlighting its adherence to the principles of international law in its 






Introduction: de facto states in international relations and EU external action  
 
The conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus date back to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union which brought about a proclamation of independence by the titular de 
facto states:1 Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia from their 
respective ‘mother states’ – Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia.2 While none of the 
former gained worldwide recognition, their functioning has been guaranteed by the 
‘patron states’ (Russia, and, in case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia), which are 
internationally recognised states supporting the self-proclaimed republics, most often 
sharing their ethnicity and acting as proxies assisting them to overcome issues linked 
to non-recognition.3 As King notes, “[i]n this limbo between war and peace, [de facto 
states] have spent the better part of a decade building real institutions that function, 
in some cases, about as well as those of the legitimate countries of which these 
republics are still, supposedly, constituent parts. All have the basic structures of 
governance and the symbols of sovereignty. All have military forces and poor but 
working economies. All have held elections for political offices”.4 Although these 
unrecognised republics are perceived by the international community as an integral 
part of their mother states, the latter do not exercise effective control over them.5   
 
It is noteworthy that from a political perspective, de facto states constitute for the 
Kremlin a safeguard to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the EU from 
approaching closer to Russia’s near abroad.6 
 
                                                     
1 While it is the most common to use the term ‘de facto states’, this term is subject to a lively 
debate and may be used interchangeably with ‘unrecognised states (republics)’, ‘separatist 
republics’, ‘self-proclaimed republics’ etc. 
2 H. Blakkisrud & P. Kolstø, “Dynamics of de facto Statehood: The South Caucasian de facto 
States between Secession and Sovereignty”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 
12, no. 2, 2012, p. 282. 
3 N. Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States”, The 
International Spectator, vol. 44, no. 4, 2009, pp. 52-53. 
4 C. King, “Eurasia’s Non-state States”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 2001, 
p. 99. 
5 S. Kolarz, “Problem of Protection of Immovable Property Situated within the Territories of De 
Facto States”, in B. Heiderhoff & I. Queirolo (eds.), Old and New Problems in Private Law, 
Canterano, Arcane, 2020, p. 118. 
6 There exist some doubts as to using the notion of de facto state with regard to Donetsk and 
Luhansk due to their relatively short existence and ongoing fights, as well as uncertainty as to 
their internal sovereignty and actual degree of popular support of their inhabitants – legitimacy 
(S. Relitz, 2019). Therefore, some scholars (J. O’Loughlin, V. Kolossov, G. Toal, 2014) suggested 
to refer to them as ‘proto de facto states’ or ‘de facto states in making’. 
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Due to the EU’s successive enlargements and the strengthening cooperation with its 
Eastern partners, the EU has increasingly become interested in a settlement of the 
conflicts over de facto states. As the Commission noted,  
if the ENP [European Neighbourhood Policy] cannot contribute to 
addressing the conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its key 
purposes. Such conflicts can threaten the Union’s own security, whether 
through the risk of escalation or of an exodus of refugees, or by interrupting 
energy supplies or cutting trade and transport links, or through the spread 
of terrorism and organised crime including trafficking in human beings, 
drugs and arms. […] The ENP can never substitute for the regional or 
multilateral efforts underway to address these issues. But the EU must be 
prepared to play a more active role here.7  
 
The main objective of this paper is to provide an introduction to the debate on de 
facto states from a legal and an EU perspective. It addresses the question how the EU 
engages with the de facto states in the Eastern Partnership. The paper argues that the 
EU’s relations with the de facto states are shaped by two co-existing and mutually non-
exclusive sets of norms: international law and EU law. The two play, however, different 
roles. While international law states some basic principles regarding the legal status of 
de facto states and generally limits the possibilities of interactions between the EU and 
the self-proclaimed republics, EU law fills this broad approach with some substance. 
This substance is defined on a case-by-case basis by the EU’s jurisprudence, 
agreements and practice which, in turn, extends the scope of potential interactions 
between Brussels and the separatist republics. International law, apart from setting the 
principle of territorial integrity, does not provide a catalogue of its subjects, nor settle 
the issue of the role of recognition. As international law does not grant the EU the 
capacity to recognise a newly-proclaimed entity as a state nor engage with it 
diplomatically, Brussels needs to find other ways to interact with de facto states, in 
conformity with international law. This interaction comprises a variety of legal and 
political instruments such as shaping the recognition practices of its member states, 
enabling the EU Delegations and Special Representatives to have contact with the de 
facto authorities, highlighting the EU’s adherence to the principles of international law 
                                                     
7 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006) 726, 
Brussels, 04.12.2006, p. 10.  
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in its political statements and jurisprudence, and pursuing a Non-recognition and 
Engagement Policy (NREP). 
 
The paper adopts a formal-dogmatic method which consists of ascertaining and 
interpreting the content of the relevant international law and EU law, as well as the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Mindful, however, 
of the shortcomings of this approach (the majority of sources is not dedicated to the 
issue of de facto statehood), the research is complemented by an analysis of EU 
documents regarding the self-proclaimed republics, including EU statements, 
speeches, declarations, press releases, reports, etc. since the early 1990s as well as the 
findings of political science scholars. In addition to this, a legal comparative method 
is applied.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the international legal 
framework with a brief overview of some lacunas of the international legal system that 
allowed de facto states to emerge, before discussing the competence of the EU in 
the field of recognition and establishment of formal relations with de facto states and 
the EU political statements in this regard. The subsequent section is then devoted to 
the EU framework, analysing the relevant CJEU jurisprudence, the agreements 
concluded with the Eastern partners and the NREP.  
 
The international legal framework shaping the EU’s relations with de facto states  
 
International law has at least three main implications which shapes the relations 
between the EU and de facto states. First, its deficiencies allow for the emergence of 
those ‘unrecognised states’. Second, the EU has to operate within the framework of 
international law limiting its competence to recognise an entity or enter in diplomatic 
relations with it. Last but not least, international norms, such as the obligation to respect 
the territorial integrity, apply to all international actors, including non-state entities, and 
therefore narrows down the scope of the EU’s discretion in shaping its policies towards 
the mother-, patron- and de facto states.  
 
The emergence of de facto states 
 
Although the notion of statehood is one of the key terms of international law, there is 
no universally accepted legal definition thereof, neither at the international nor at the 
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European level. The most common is to refer to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention 
of 1933 stipulates that “[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) identified territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”.8 Obviously, 
such a wording leaves some leeway for interpretation and, in consequence, allows de 
facto states to emerge.  
 
Moreover, as a consequence of their sovereignty, states are the only primary subjects 
of international law; all other subjects are of a derivative character and the decision 
to recognise the legal personality of a new entity is left entirely to states.9 Contrary to 
national law, however, international law does not contain a list of its subjects nor 
criteria to become a subject, again leaving a margin for discussion on a case-by-case 
basis and taking decisions based on political, rather than legal, considerations.10 
 
Finally, despite the exclusion of recognition from the criteria of statehood in the 
Montevideo Convention, the declaratory, constitutive or mixed role of recognition 
remains a subject of lively debate among scholars. According to declaratory theory, 
a state becomes a subject of international law at the moment of its emergence on 
the international level, while recognition is just a political confirmation of that fact.11 By 
contrast, the constitutive theory claims that a state becomes a subject of international 
law only upon its recognition by the international community.12 Regardless of the 
theory adopted, practice demonstrates that the lack of recognition disables an entity 
to effectively act on the international level.13 Therefore, de facto states struggle for 
worldwide recognition to increase their security (regulation of the legal status will 
render any acts of coercion by the mother state unfounded and illegal), stabilise their 
                                                     
8 International Conference of American States, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States, signed at Montevideo on 26 December 1933. 
9 J. Barcik & T. Srogosz, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne, Warsaw, C.H. Beck, 2014, 2nd ed., p. 
144; R. Kwiecień, Podmiotowość prawnomiędzynarodowa państwa, in: ed. B. Mielnik, A. 
Wnukiewicz – Kozłowska, Podmiotowość w prawie międzynarodowym, Wrocław, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2013, p. 38. 
10 P. Bogacki, “Zagadnienie podmiotowości prawnej w stosunkach międzynarodowych”, 
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych, vol. VII, 1997, p. 214. 
11 L. Antonowicz, Rzecz o państwach i prawie międzynarodowym, Lublin, Monografie Wydziału 
Administracji WSEI, 2012, p. 95. 
12 L. Antonowicz, Państwa i terytoria. Studium prawnomiędzynarodowe, Warsaw, PWN, 1988, p. 
96. 
13 A. Murphy & V. Stancescu, “State formation and recognition in international law”, Juridical 
Tribune, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017, p. 7. 
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economies (by accessing foreign markets) and effectively enjoy other international 
rights and privileges.14  
 
So far, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognised by Russia, Syria, Nauru, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua (temporally by Tuvalu, and Abkhazia also by Vanuatu), 
and the other separatist republics by none.15 Legally, this dynamic is explained by 
Lynch who, while referring to the Montevideo Convention, explains that: “[t]he de 
facto states fulfil the first three of these criteria, and claim to be able to pursue the 
fourth. However, the empirical qualifications of the de facto state cannot make it legal 
or legitimate in international society”.16 Their non-recognition is justified by the 
obligation to respect the principles of international law (e.g. sovereignty and territorial 
integrity) and, as some scholars argue, an entity that has emerged in violation thereof 
shall not be (called) a state.17   
 
The EU’s competence to recognise states and to establish diplomatic relations 
 
From the perspective of recognition, the relations between the EU and de facto states 
are shaped by two elements of the international legal framework. The EU, being itself 
a derivative subject of international law, does (at least formally) not have a 
competence to recognise an entity as a state. Nevertheless, Brussels is bound not to 
act in a way that could seem to recognise movements violating international law.  
 
Although no international legal norm exists that requires international actors to 
recognise new entities, the international community is increasingly prone to agree on 
                                                     
14 S. von Steinsdorff, “Incomplete state building – incomplete democracy? How to interpret 
internal political development in the post-Soviet de facto states. Conclusion”, Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, vol. 45, nos. 1-2, 2012, p. 205; G. Wilson, “Secession and Intervention in 
the Former Soviet Space: The Crimean Incident and Russian Interference in Its ‘Near Abroad’”, 
Liverpool Law Review, vol. 37, 2016, p. 169.  
15 D. Ó Beacháin, G. Comai & A. Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili, “The secret lives of unrecognised 
states: Internal dynamics, external relations, and counterrecognition strategies”, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, vol. 27, no. 3, 2016, p. 452; Radio Free Europe, South Ossetia Recognizes 'Luhansk 
People's Republic', published online 19.06.2014, retrieved 02.04.2020, https://www.rferl.org/ 
a/south-ossetia-recognizes-luhansk-peoples-republic/25427651.html. 
16 D. Lynch, “Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts”, International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, 2002, 
p. 835. 
17 L. Antonowicz, państwa w prawie międzynarodowym [The Notion of Statehood in Public 
International Law], Warsaw, PWN, 1974, p. 134; L. Broers, “Mirrors of the World: The Claims to 
Legitimacy and International Recognition of De Facto States in the South Caucasus”, Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 11, p. 145. 
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the existence of an obligation not to recognise entities arising from the violation of 
international law.18  
 
The legal framework for granting or refusing recognition is specified by national laws. 
EU membership does not affect this. The EU has no competence, neither on the 
grounds of international law nor within its own legal framework, to recognise an entity 
as a state. Nevertheless, the practice reveals that it would be wrong to assume that 
Brussels does not play any role in this respect. First, the emergence of regional 
organisations in general induced a tendency to coordinate recognition acts by their 
members and also set substantive benchmarks for granting or withholding 
recognition.19 Second, the EU gathers influential states such as France and Germany 
(and until recently the United Kingdom), plays the role of a “normative power” and 
sets standards that are followed by the other international actors.20  
 
It seems, however, that it is easier to justify and observe the EU exercising non-
recognition (than recognition) because a situation arising out of a violation of law can 
be condemned by any subject of international law. This is illustrated by the European 
Council Conclusions calling states not to recognise the proclamation of 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the Russo-Georgian war in 200821 
or a joint statement on Crimea by the President of the European Council and the 
President of the European Commission ‒ the two bodies entrusted to externally 
represent the Union as such (and not its Member States) on the basis of Articles 15(6) 
and 17(1) TEU.22 Moreover, the EU condemns any unjustified recognition by third states, 
as in the case of the recognition of the aforementioned separatist republics by 
Russia.23 
 
                                                     
18 G. Wilson, op. cit., p. 164.  
19 E. Newman & G. Visoka, “The European Union’s practice of state recognition: Between norms 
and interests”, Review of International Studies, vol. 44, no. 4, 2018, p. 6. 
20 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258. 
21Council of the EU, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 06.10.2008, p. 2. 
22 European Council, Joint statement on Crimea by President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, EUCO 58/14, 
Brussels, 16.03.201; EU, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, pp. 13–390. 
23 European Commission, Speech of the Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, EU/Russia: a challenging partnership, but one of the most important of 
our times, Strasbourg 21.10.2008.    
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In the 1990s, the EU made three non-legally binding attempts to coordinate the 
recognition practices of its member states: the so-called ‘Carrington formula’, the 
Council's declaration on the guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union, and the report of the so-called ‘Badinter Committee’.24 
The EU thus became the author of the ‘conditional recognition’ doctrine which 
suggests increased chances for international recognition for entities that respect 
democracy, the rule of law and the rights of minorities,25 but it has not elaborated any 
binding regulatory framework, let alone the competence to recognise new states. 
Therefore, the EU has to rely on its member states to build a consensus on a case-by-
case basis.26 If this happens, the Union issues a joint statement (guidelines, 
communication or other non-binding instrument) on behalf of its members who 
subsequently proceed with the recognition on the basis of their respective national 
procedures.27 However, as the examples of Kosovo and Palestine demonstrate, this is 
not always the case.  
 
Although the Council confirmed that “Member States will decide, in accordance with 
national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo”,28 the EU has 
nevertheless implicitly suggested its support for the entity’s independence by signing 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Pristina in 2015. This is not a mixed 
agreement to be ratified by all member states, therefore pushing some hesitating 
members to engage without recognition.29 Similarly, the Euro-Mediterranean Interim 
Association Agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation was signed in 1997.30 
                                                     
24 S. Blay, “Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the Post-Communist Era”, Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, vol. 22, no 2-3, 1994, pp. 275-315, p. 311; EPC Declaration on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of 16 December 1991, as 
reproduced in R. Caplan, Europe and the recognition of new states in Yugoslavia, 2005, pp. 
187-188; A. Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for 
the Self-Determination of Peoples”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 3, no. 1, 1992, 
p. 178. 
25 S. von Steinsdorff, op. cit., p. 205. 
26 E. Newman & G. Visoka, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
27 Ibid., pp. 14, 12. 
28 Council of the EU, Press release “2851st Council meeting. General Affairs and External 
Relations”, Brussels, 18.02.2008, p. 2.  
29 D. Wydra, “Between Normative Visions and Pragmatic Possibilities: The European Politics of 
State Recognition”, Geopolitics, vol. 25, no. 2, 2020, p. 335.  
30 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the 
European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, OJ L 
187, 16.7.1997, pp. 3-135. 
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It may therefore be concluded that the EU actively shapes the practice of recognition 
of its member states despite the lack of a formally conferred competence to do so.  
 
A comparable dynamic may be observed on the level of direct engagement with de 
facto states. While the EU cannot formally establish diplomatic relations with 
unrecognised states, it nevertheless interacts directly with them. This is illustrated by the 
practice of the EU Delegations to mother states and the EU Special Representatives 
(EUSR). The EU Delegation to Moldova maintains formal and informal contacts with 
Transnistria.31 Apart from representing the EU in the ‘5+2’ peace negotiation format32 
since 2005, it constitutes a channel through which Brussels finances and facilitates 
confidence-building measures (CBM).33 Moreover, the EU Delegation was entrusted 
with the negotiation of the extension of the application of the EU-Moldova Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) to the separatist republic.34 Importantly, its 
contacts with the de facto authorities have not been limited to trade; despite not 
being explicitly mandated to cooperate with the Transnistrian leadership, the 
Delegation visits the region on a weekly basis to run CBM projects.35 Similarly, while the 
main tasks of the EU Delegation to Georgia comprise the implementation of the 
Association Agreement and DCFTA, it has also been the biggest funder of CBM, 
development and security projects in Abkhazia and, until 2008-2010, in South Ossetia.36 
On the contrary, there is hardly any evidence of contacts of the EU Delegations in 
Baku and Kiev with the separatist republics.  
 
Leaving some leeway to engage with de facto states is even more visible in the 
mandates of the EU Special Representatives shaped by the decision on the 
appointment. While the mandates of the EUSR to Moldova included “developing and 
                                                     
31 V. Axyonova & A. Gawrich, “Regional Organizations and Secessionist Entities: Analysing 
Practices of the EU and the OSCE in Post-Soviet Protracted Conflict Areas”, Ethnopolitics, vol. 
17, no. 4, 2018, p. 417. 
32 The ‘5+2’ format includes: Transnistria, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, and two 
observers: the EU and the US. 
33 S. Relitz, “The stabilisation dilemma: conceptualising international responses to secession and 
de facto states”, East European Politics, vol. 35, no. 3, 2019, p. 15. 
34 M. Dembińska & F. Mérand, “The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of 
Transnistria”, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, 2019, p. 23. 
35 V. Axyonova & A. Gawrich, op. cit., p. 416. 
36 S. Relitz, op. cit., p. 15; EU, 2011 Annual Action Programme for Georgia, Support to conflict 





maintaining close contacts with all relevant actors”,37 the current mandate of the EUSR 
for the South Caucasus encompasses “develop[ing] contacts with governments, 
parliaments, other key political actors, the judiciary and civil society in the region” and 
“intensify[ing] the Union's dialogue with the main actors concerned regarding the 
region”.38 This wording suggests that the EU allowed its Representatives to have 
contacts with the de facto authorities, yet in practice, this varies from case to case. 
The EUSR has a limited access to Nagorno-Karabakh, but he maintains contacts with 
its ‘authorities’.39 While he can enter South Ossetia only for the purpose of preparing 
the Geneva International Discussions (GID) meetings four times a year and has hardly 
any contact with its leadership or the civil society organisations, the access to 
Abkhazia is more open.40 
 
This state-of-art may be explained by the findings of Axyonova and Gawrich who 
underline that the EU is more prone to accept an extension of actions beyond the 
mandate if the risk of conflict re-escalation is low (Transnistria).41 It tends to act 
according to the mandate when such a risk is higher (Nagorno-Karabakh) and goes 
beyond it only for the sake of the prevention of a conflict re-escalation (South 
Ossetia).42 As far as the physical access of members of the EU Delegations to de facto 
states is concerned, there is also a legal explanation. On the basis of Article 5(6) of the 
‘EEAS Decision’, the High Representative is responsible to enter in arrangements with 
the host states (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine) to ensure the Delegation staff 
enjoys “privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations”.43 According to the latter, “[t]he person of a 
                                                     
37 Council of the EU, Council Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 appointing a Special 
Representative of the European Union for Moldova, OJ L 81, 30.3.2005, pp. 50–52, Article 3, 
emphasis added; EU, Council Joint Action 2007/107/CFSP of 15 February 2007 appointing the 
European Union Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova, OJ L 46, 16.2.2007, pp. 
59–62, Article 3, emphasis added. 
38 Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/907 of 25 June 2018 extending the mandate 
of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 
ST/8849/2018/INIT, OJ L 161, 26.6.2018, p. 27–31, Article 3(a, g); EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 
2020/254 of 25 February 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/907 extending the mandate of 
the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 
ST/5958/2020/INIT, OJ L 54I , 26.2.2020, pp. 11–12. 
39 European Parliament, parliamentary questions, written response by Vice-President of the 
Commission, retrieved 16.04.2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-
2018-000464-ASW_EN.html. 
40 V. Axyonova & A. Gawrich, op. cit., p. 418. 
41 Ibid., p. 423. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Council of the EU, Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, pp. 30–40, Article 5(6). 
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diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. […] The receiving State shall […] take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”44 As the 
mother states cannot ensure the protection of the EU representatives on separatist 
territories, the more fragile the situation, the less they are willing to assume the 
responsibility related to allowing them entering this areas. Politically, this argument may 
also be valid in the case of the EUSRs. 
 
Despite these attempts to intensify its presence in de facto states, the EU highlights its 
commitment to the principles of international law, as is illustrated by its statements. 
 
Principles of international law reflected in EU statements  
 
Regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU underlines its “firm support for Georgia's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”45 and 
commits to a “peaceful resolution of [the] conflict”, from time to time adding “in line 
with OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles and 
commitments and the fundamental norms of international law”.46 Nevertheless, it also 
highlights a commitment to an “engagement with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, in support of longer-term conflict resolution”.47 
 
The discourse on Nagorno-Karabakh is different compared to the Georgian separatist 
republics. First, the EU calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to refrain from the use of force 
and resume the talks, underlining that the maintenance of the status quo is not an 
option.48 Second, the commitment to the preservation of the Azerbaijani territorial 
integrity is not as firm as in the case of Georgia. For instance, the EU calls on Yerevan 
and Baku “to continue their efforts to find a peaceful settlement based on mutual 
compromise”49 or “confirms its support for […] a stable political agreement concerning 
                                                     
44 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961, Article 29. 
45 E.g. EEAS, Local EU Statement on the 11 years anniversary of the conflict between Russia and 
Georgia, Tbilisi, 07.08.2019. 
46 E.g. EEAS, EU Statement on the situation in Georgia delivered at the OSCE Permanent Council 
meeting in Vienna, 5 September 2019, Vienna. 
47 E.g. Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, Georgia and the EU, retrieved 05.04.2020, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/49070/georgia-and-eu_en. 
48 E.g. EEAS, Statement by the Spokesperson on a helicopter incident in the context of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Brussels, 12.11.2014. 
49 E.g. European Council, Göteborg Statement, Göteborg, 14.06.2001, emphasis added. 
Stefania Kolarz 
14 
Nagorno Karabakh, which should be acceptable to both Armenia and Azerbaijan”.50 
It “supports a peaceful resolution […] on the basis of the principles of non-use of force, 
territorial integrity and the self-determination of peoples”51 and the OSCE’s Madrid 
principles (according to which a referendum regarding the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh shall be held).52 Third, as a latecomer, the EU leaves the floor to the OSCE, 
supporting the efforts of the Minsk Group and confirming its readiness to play a 
complementary role, especially in the field of confidence-building.53  
 
As far as Transnistria is concerned, the EU supports peaceful dispute settlement and 
negotiations in the ‘5+2’ format54, underlining the respect for “the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria”.55 
Similarly to the South Caucasus conflicts, the EU reiterates its willingness to contribute 
to the CBM,56 and sees its role as facilitator of the peaceful conflict settlement57 “in 
close consultation with OSCE”.58  
 
Overall, this demonstrates that the EU’s general approach towards de facto states is 
consistent with international law and/or the principles of conflict settlement 
elaborated during peace processes, insisting on non-recognition but, also non-
isolation (e.g. CBM). International law, however, does not provide any guidelines as to 
                                                     
50 E.g. EU, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on forthcoming 
“Presidential elections" in Nagorno Karabakh, Brussels, 02.08.2002, emphasis added. 
51 E.g. European Commission, Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Tigran 
Sargsyan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Brussels, 15.03.2011; European Council, 
Statement by President Herman Van Rompuy after his meeting with President of Azerbaijan, 
Ilham Aliyev, Brussels, 22.06.2011. 
52 E.g. European Council, Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 
following the meeting with Serzh Sargsyan, Brussels, 06.03.2012. 
53 E.g. European Commission, Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with 
President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Brussels, 21.06.2013. 
54 E.g. Council of the EU, Press release “2896th Council meeting General Affairs and External 
Relations General Affairs Luxembourg, 13 October 2008”, published online 13.10.2008, retrieved 
05.04.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_08_287. 
55 E.g. European Commission, Statement by High Representative/Vice President Federica 
Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the appointment of Prime Minister Chiril 
Gaburici and the formation of the government in the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 18.02.2015. 
56 E.g. Council of the EU, Press release “2896th Council meeting General Affairs and External 
Relations. General Affairs”, published online 13.10.2008, retrieved 05.04.2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_08_287 
57 E.g. Council of the EU, European Union - Ukraine Summit the Hague, 8 July 2004 - Joint press 
release, The Hague, 08.07.2014.  
58 Council of the EU, Press release “2590th Council Meeting General Affairs and External 
Relations. General Affairs”, Luxembourg, 14.06.2004.  
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how to implement such a non-recognition combined with non-isolation. Therefore, the 
answer shall be sought on the basis of EU law and practice.  
 
The EU framework for dealing with de facto states  
 
The normative framework for the EU’s engagement with de facto states is contained 
in the CJEU jurisprudence and, more directly, in the Union’s agreements with mother 
states. It is further supplemented by its practice.  
 
De facto states in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice  
 
Until today, there was no CJEU judgment referring directly to the legal status of 
Donbas, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, two 
cases seem to be of particular relevance: T-512/12 (Front Polisario v. Council) and C-
420/07 (Apostolides). While the former refers to the Western Sahara and the latter to 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), they both demonstrate how the CJEU 
approaches the status of entities aspiring for independence in the application of EU 
law and the interpretation of the EU’s international agreements.  
 
In the Front Polisario case, the CJEU qualified the applicant, the national liberation 
movement Front Polisario, as a legal person of private law in order to meet the criteria 
of admissibility set out in Article 263 TFEU. Since it was impossible for the Front to satisfy 
the requirement of providing the Court with an extract from the register of companies, 
the CJEU eventually recalled the autonomous character of the term ‘legal person’ 
under EU law and stated that “in certain specific cases, an entity which does not have 
a legal personality under the law of a Member State or of a non-member State may 
nevertheless be regarded as a ‘legal person’ within the meaning of Article 263 […], in 
particular, where by their acts or actions, the European Union and its institutions treat 
the entity in question as being a distinct person, which may have rights specific to it, 
or be subject to obligations or restrictions”.59 It set a further requirement of having 
“constituting documents and an internal structure giving it the independence 
necessary to act as a responsible body in legal matters”.60  
 
                                                     
59 CJEU, case Т-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council, judgement of 10.12.2015, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, 
paras. 48, 52. 
60 Ibid., paras. 53-54. 
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This reasoning raises the question whether de facto states can successfully act before 
the CJEU. On the one hand, the requirements of internal documentation and structure 
seem to be satisfied. On the other hand, the action could be unsuccessful since none 
of the EU institutions or bodies seems to treat de facto authorities, apart from the 
Transnistrian leadership (a direct addressee of multiple EU statements and sanctions61), 
as a ‘distinct person’. In addition to this, it is unclear to what extent the CJEU attaches 
importance to the perception of such separatist authorities as a representative of a 
given population. In this respect, it could be argued that the differences between de 
facto states and the United Nations (UN) non-self-governing territories shall be taken 
into account; contrary to oftentimes blacklisted authorities of de facto states, Front 
Polisario is internationally recognised as a national liberation movement.62 While the 
latter enjoy the right to self-determination under international law, granting a right to 
secession to the former remains a subject to discussion.63  
 
Although the T-512/12 (Front Polisario v. Council) decision was set aside by the Court’s 
new judgement C‑104/16 as the result of an appeal by the Council, the mere 
approach of equating the entity struggling for its independence to a legal person 
under national law was not contested. Moreover, the CJEU highlighted that “where a 
treaty is intended to apply not only to the territory of a State but also beyond that 
territory, that treaty expressly provides for it, whether it is a territory ‘under jurisdiction’ 
of that State […] or in any territory ‘for whose international relations [that State] is 
responsible’”.64 This is also vital for the analysis of the legal status of de facto states 
under agreements the EU concluded with their respective patron states. Even 
assuming the exercise of effective jurisdiction by the patron states over the separatist 
territories, the agreement shall not be interpreted as covering also those self-
proclaimed republics, unless there is an explicit contractual stipulation to the contrary.  
 
                                                     
61 E.g. Council Decision 2012/170/CFSP of 23 March 2012 amending Decision 2010/573/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the 
Republic of Moldova (OJ L 87, 24.3.2012, p. 92); Council Decision 2012/527/CFSP of 27 
September 2012 amending Decision 2010/573/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against 
the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (OJ L 263, 28.9.2012, p. 
44). 
62 S. Secrieru, “The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles for trust building 
(2009-2010)”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2011, pp. 248-249. 
63 G. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 168-169. 
64 CJEU, case C‑104/16 Front Polisario c. Council, judgement of 21.12.2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, 
para. 96. 
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Similarly, the preliminary ruling in the Apostolides case seems to underline a priority of 
legal over actual status of de facto states. The CJEU decision originated from the 
inquiry about the possible recognition of the judgement in circumstances where the 
applicability of the acquis communautaire, including Regulation No 44/2001 on the 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters that would serve as legal basis, has been suspended in the TRNC 
as the Cypriot government does not exercise effective control there.65 The Court 
underlined that Regulation No 44/2001 “merely designates the Member State whose 
courts have jurisdiction ratione materiae, but does not allocate jurisdiction within the 
Member State concerned”66 and that “[t]he fact that the land is situated in the 
northern area may possibly have an effect on the domestic jurisdiction of the Cypriot 
courts, but cannot have any effect for the purposes of that regulation”.67 It could 
therefore be concluded that the Court treats de facto states as integral parts of their 
respective mother states.68 Taking this argument one step further, it could be argued 
that, should the Court refuse to apply the Regulation, it would not only violate EU law, 
but also suggest the existence of the TRNC as a separate state. As Advocate General 
Kokott explained, the Regulation would not be applicable only if the situation 
concerned the direct enforcement in the TRNC (instead of the Republic of Cyprus) of 
a judgement of a member state or an enforcement in a member state of a judgement 
rendered by a court of the TRNC.69 Importantly, she underlined that the suspension of 
acquis shall “be limited to what is absolutely necessary”, since this solution shall 
“promote the growing together of the two parts of the country”.70 
 
The lesson learned for de facto states from this case is that apart from treating the 
mother state as the only entity bound by EU law and the de facto state as its 
administrative unit, the potential non-application of EU law to the separatist territories 
shall be limited to the greatest possible extent. The EU does not wish to jeopardise the 
peace process between the mother state and its separatist territory through its own 
closer integration with the mother state.  
                                                     
65 CJEU, case C-420/07, paras. 30-31. 
66 Ibid., para. 48. 
67 Ibid., para. 51. 
68 S. Kolarz, „Problem Członkostwa Tureckiej Republiki Cypru Północnego w Unii Europejskiej”, 
in: ed. J. Helios, W. Jedlecka, A. Kwieciński, „Prawo wobec wyzwań współczesności: wybrane 
problemy teoretycznoprawne i dogmatycznoprawne”, Wrocław, 2019, p. 119. 
69 CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, case C‑420/07, 18.12.2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:749, 
para. 31. 
70 Ibid., paras. 35, 38, 41-42. 
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It could be argued, however, that this is the case of Cyprus which, as EU member state, 
has much stronger bonds with the Union than the Eastern partners. Nevertheless, even 
before the Cypriot accession to the EU, the CJEU was advocating for its territorial 
integrity e.g. in the Anastasiou case concerning the non-recognition of TRNC import 
certificates under the Association Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Cyprus.71 Importantly, also in this case the Court’s 
reasoning was based on an interpretation of the EU-Cyprus agreement as applicable 
to the whole island, rather than on the duty of non-recognition.72 Therefore, it is worth 
exploring whether the territorial scope of application of the EU agreements with the 
Eastern partners is in line with the aforementioned jurisprudence. 
 
The issue of de facto states in EU agreements with mother states 
 
As far as the EU’s contractual approach towards de facto states is concerned, two 
types of acts shall be taken into consideration: Association Agreements including 
DCFTAs, as well as readmission agreements, both concluded between the Union and 
particular partners. Other agreements having more limited implications for de facto 
states (e.g. visa liberalisation arrangements which focus on personal instead of 
territorial application) will not be analysed. Moreover, in line with the reasoning in the 
C‑104/16 judgement no reference will be made to the arrangements with patron 
states, Armenia and Russia, since these agreements apply only to their internationally 
recognised territories.73 
 
The EU-Georgia Association Agreement of 2014 applies, according to its Article 429, to 
the territory of Georgia.74 It contains, however, a clarification that “[t]he application 
of this Agreement, or of Title IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) thereof, in relation 
to Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia over which the 
                                                     
71 E. Kontorovich, “Economic Dealings with Occupied Territories”, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, vol. 53, no. 584, 2014-2015, p. 622. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Armenia, of the other part, OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4–466, Article 393; Agreement on 
partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part; original 
text: OJ L 327, 28.11.1997, p. 3–69, Article 110. 
74 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L 261, 
30.8.2014, pp. 4–743, Article 429(1). 
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Government of Georgia does not exercise effective control, shall commence once 
Georgia ensures the full implementation and enforcement of this Agreement, or of 
Title IV (Trade and Trade-related Matters) thereof, respectively, on its entire territory”.75 
So far, however, such an extension has not been made. The EU’s Association 
Agreement with Moldova provides in its Article 462 the same solution regarding its 
territorial scope, but since 1 January 2016 the DCFTA applies also to Transnistria.76  
 
The other difference between the two agreements is that in the Association 
Agreement with Georgia the parties limit their statements to a reiteration of the need 
for reconciliation,77 while the Association Agreement with Moldova additionally 
emphasises reintegration.78 Importantly, both agreements underline the “commitment 
to peaceful conflict resolution in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Georgia [Moldova] within its internationally recognised borders”, but the Georgian 
one additionally refers to non-recognition and engagement with the breakaway 
republics.79 
 
Paradoxically, on the level of implementation, it is rather Moldova that illustrates the 
mother state’s more cooperative approach. For instance, Transnistrian companies 
already benefit from the EU pre-DCFTA preferential system,80 its leadership was invited 
as an observer to the Association Agreement negotiations81 and the agreement was 
published also in Russian, which is not the official language in Moldova, but most 
spoken in Transnistria.82 Although a comparable level of engagement could be 
                                                     
75 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ L 261, 
30.8.2014, pp. 4–743, Article 429(2). 
76 European Commission, Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission to the 
European Parliament question E-001168/2016, retrieved 03.04.2020, https://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-001168-ASW_EN.html; EU, Remarks by Johannes Hahn 
on behalf of the HR/VP at the EP Plenary, retrieved 03.04.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_121. 
77 E.g. Association Agreement with Georgia, Article 9. 
78 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the 
other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, pp. 4–738, Preamble. 
79 Association Agreement with Moldova, Article 8; Association Agreement with Georgia, Article 
9. 
80 V. Baar & B. Baarová, “De facto states and their socio-economic structures in the post-Soviet 
space after the annexation of Crimea”, Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej, vol. 6, 2017, 
pp. 278-279. 
81 M. Dembińska & F. Mérand, op. cit., p. 23.  
82 European Commission, EU-Moldova: relations developing at full speed, Brussels, 2014, 
retrieved 05.04.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_14_54. 
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expected from Georgia, the more inclusive approach dates from 2018 only when the 
Georgian government presented its ‘A Step to a Better Future’ initiative which 
mentions the possibility for Abkhazia to benefit from the DCFTA on the basis of a status-
neutral registration of their entrepreneurs in Georgia.83 
 
The Association Agreement with Ukraine, containing a DCFTA as well, fully entered into 
force on 1 September 2017.84 It does not refer to the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine.85 The 
same remains valid for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1996 
concluded between Brussels and Baku which applies to the territory of Azerbaijan 
without providing any exceptions.86 While the agreement does not even mention the 
name of the separatist region, the only reference to its particular situation is made in 
the preamble which invokes “support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan”.87  
 
It may thus be concluded that all the above-mentioned agreements follow one of the 
two patterns: either the territory of de facto state is excluded from the scope of 
application of the agreement, or the latter does not make any difference between 
governmentally controlled and separatist regions. An explanation for the parallel 
existence of those apparently incoherent approaches, apart from purely political 
considerations, may be sought in the timing of the negotiations and the entry into 
force of the respective agreements. In the case of Moldova and Georgia the time 
between the proclamation of independence by Transnistria, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia and the negotiation of the agreement was much longer than in the case of 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine, rendering an adjustment of the territorial scope of application 
of the Association Agreements more justified.  
 
                                                     
83 P. Gaprindashvili et al., One step closer – Georgia, EU-integration, and the settlement of the 
frozen conflicts?, GRASS – Georgia’s Reforms Associates Reformanda, Tbilisi, 2019, p. 17. 
84 EU, EU relations with Ukraine, retrieved 01.04.2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine. 
85 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3–2137, Articles 9 and 483. 
86 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, OJ L 246, 
17.9.1999, pp. 3–51, Article 101. 
87 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, OJ L 246, 
17.9.1999, preamble. 
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What the two solutions have in common, however, is that both create legal 
uncertainty. On the one hand, Moldova (in respect to non-trade-related issues) and 
Georgia risk that the non-implementation of the reforms and the EU standards in their 
separatist regions result in a further moving away of those de facto states, thus 
jeopardising the reintegration perspectives.88 On the other hand, Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine (and Moldova with respect to trade-related issues), take the responsibility for 
the implementation of their contractual obligations in the areas that are actually 
beyond their effective control. Interestingly, the latter is also valid for the readmission 
agreements.  
 
The readmission agreements between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine apply to their respective territories with no exception regarding de facto 
states.89 Importantly, each of them contains a provision binding the respective partner 
not only to readmit its own citizens, but also third-country nationals who illegally 
entered the EU from its territory.90 Although there are currently no flights between the 
separatist territories and the EU, the situation may change. For instance, while the only 
airport in Nagorno-Karabakh does not have an International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) code to operate international flights, the Abkhazian airport managed to 
overcome this issue by using the already existing codes of Sukhumi airport from the 
Soviet era and intends to reopen.91 Also Transnistria plans to transform its operating 
military airport for passenger transport.92 Those developments shall thus be closely 
monitored. Although the risk may be mitigated by a refusal of the EU27 to establish 
connections with de facto states, a consensus of the member states can never be 
taken for granted. Moreover, such a potential ‘boycott’ could also be challenged 
                                                     
88 D. Tolksdorf, “Russia, the USA and the EU and the conflicts in the wider Black Sea region: the 
potential for multilateral solutions in the wake of the Ukraine conflict”, Global Affairs, vol. 1, no. 
4-5, 2015, pp. 421-430. 
89 Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation, OJ L 52, 25.2.2011, pp. 47–65, Article 21; Agreement between the 
European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the readmission of persons residing without 
authorisation, OJ L 128, 30.4.2014, pp. 17–42, Article 22; Agreement between the European 
Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of persons residing without 
authorisation, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, pp. 149–167, Article 21; Agreement between the European 
Community and Ukraine on the readmission of persons, OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, pp. 48–65, Article 
18. 
90 E.g. Article 3(1)(b) Readmission Agreement with Moldova. 
91 J. Kucera, “Abkhazia announces plans to reopen airport”, Eurasianet, published online 
30.07.2019, retrieved 10.04.2020, https://eurasianet.org/abkhazia-announces-plans-to-reopen-
airport. 
92 C. Vlas, “Tiraspol wants its airport to be reopened”, Moldova.org, published online 28.12.2017, 
retrieved 10.04.2020, https://www.moldova.org/en/tiraspol-wants-airport-reopened. 
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from the perspective of the goal of increasing people-to-people relations promoted 
by the EU with respect to all areas of the Eastern Partnership. 
 
The overview of the two types of agreements thus leaves the impression that the EU 
does not pay enough attention to the practical issues arising from the application or 
non-application of the contractual arrangements with the mother states to the de 
facto states. Neither does the EU encourage the mother states to act more proactively 
towards a conflict settlement by using conditionality. Yet, the EU addresses the issue 
of de facto states with a pragmatic policy. 
 
Non-recognition and Engagement Policy: the EU’s pragmatic approach 
 
An opposition to the secession of the de facto states and their non-recognition does 
not mean that international actors, including the EU, do not maintain any contacts at 
all.93 Although the degree of cooperation with particular separatist republics varies, 
none of them is completely isolated.94 Brussels uses the NREP, implying an interaction 
with de facto states “in a way that does not formally acknowledge their existence as 
an independent state”.95 The concept was launched by the EUSR for the South 
Caucasus, Peter Semneby, who in 2009 prepared a non-paper designing “the vision 
of interaction with breakaway territories without compromising Georgia’s territorial 
integrity within the post-2008 August war context”.96 This de-isolation and confidence-
building activity is crucial to conflict settlement and a precondition for a durable 
peace,97 helping to close the gap between the mother states pursuing EU-oriented 
reforms and the de facto states which have not implemented them in parallel.98  
 
It should be noted, however, that even if allowed, the engagement relies on the 
consent of the mother state; the latter may for instance insist on limiting the 
engagement to the elements necessary for the future reintegration, on being a proxy 
                                                     
93 S. Relitz, op. cit., p. 2. 
94 N. Caspersen, “Recognition, Status Quo or Reintegration: Engagement with de facto States”, 
Ethnopolitics, vol. 17, no. 4, 2018, pp. 373-389, p. 376. 
95 E. Berg & K. Vits, “Quest for Survival and Recognition: Insights into the Foreign Policy 
Endeavours of the Post-Soviet de facto States”, Ethnopolitics, vol. 17, no. 4, 2018, p. 393. 
96 J. Ker-Lindsay & E. Berg, “Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de 
facto States”, Ethnopolitics, vol. 17, no. 4, 2018, p. 337. 
97 N. Caspersen, “Recognition…”, op. cit., p. 373; EEAS, Statement by the spokesperson of HR 
Catherine Ashton on the adoption of the Georgian Action Plan for Engagement for Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, Brussels 08.07.2010. 
98 D. Tolksdorf, op. cit. 
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in contacts between the unrecognised entity and the third party, or on subjecting any 
action to its prior approval.99 In this respect, the mother states vary significantly from a 
very cooperative Moldova to a more hesitant Georgia and an even more reluctant 
Azerbaijan.100 For instance, on the basis of the 2008 Law on Occupied Territories, Tbilisi 
requires any actor willing to engage with Abkhazia or South Ossetia to obtain a prior 
written authorisation from the Georgian authorities (except for urgent humanitarian 
assistance which just needs to be notified to the government).101  
 
Moreover, on the implementation level, an action may be subject to further demands 
from the mother states. This was, for instance, the case for the EU educational 
exchange programmes and scholarships for schools of Nagorno-Karabakh and South 
Ossetia, where Baku and Tbilisi asked for the introduction of an eligibility criterion 
consisting of the possession of an Azerbaijani or Georgian passport respectively.102 
Although both could reasonably require their citizens to have suitable documents, this 
has jeopardised the initiative since most often inhabitants of de facto states had 
renounced those citizenships and, apart from the unrecognised one, they usually use 
passports of their patron states.103 The approach of Tbilisi, however, tends to liberalise; 
in 2018 it adopted a set of laws ‘A Step to a Better Future’ sketching some perspectives 
for extending Georgia's EU integration benefits to the de facto states.104  
 
Importantly, for reasons of effectiveness rather than legal concerns, the EU’s 
engagement shall also be accepted by the respective partners in the de facto state. 
Particular EU projects thus often provide for their ‘consultation and consent’.105 For 
instance, while any action in Transnistria shall be coordinated with the Moldovan 
                                                     
99 N. Caspersen, “Recognition…”, op. cit., p. 381. 
100 U. Jakša, “EU Policy Options towards Post-Soviet De Facto States”, PISM Policy Paper, no. 6 
(159), 2017, p. 7. 
101 Georgia, Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, 23.10.2008, Article 6. 
102 D. Ó Beacháin, G. Comai & A. Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili, op. cit., p. 444. 
103 P. Jolicoeur, “L’Union européenne et l’OTAN face à l’implication de la Russie dans les conflits 
gelés. Deux voies divergentes”, Études internationales, vol. 40, no. 4, 2009, p. 551. 
104 European Comission, Joint Staff Working Document: Association Implementation Report on 
Georgia, Brussels, 2019, p. 5. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2019_association_ 
implementation_report_georgia.pdf  
105 EU, 2007 Annual Action Programme for Georgia, Economic Rehabilitation Action Fiche, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enpi_2007_c2007_5372_ 




Ministry of Reintegration,106 the EU shall then consult with the Transnistrian leadership, 
which is generally open for such a cooperation.107 South Ossetia, in turn, has for years 
been refusing any form of international engagement.108 Therefore, projects initially 
addressed to both Georgian de facto states are rather implemented in Abkhazia 
only.109 The EU underlines, however, that it is “important to continue to search for all 
creative ways to continue to engage in South Ossetia”.110  
 
Importantly, the EU thus does not passively wait for the acceptance of its policies 
underlining the necessity of ‘creative’ and ‘pragmatic’ engagement with de facto 
states.111 In this context one could also ask whether the EU has the competence to 
engage without recognition? Needless to say, at no point the Treaties refer to this 
policy. Therefore, the competence depends on how the particular actions will be 
framed, e.g. as trade, development or humanitarian aid. The legal qualification 
concentrates therefore on the object and not the subject of EU action. Moreover, 
since the NREP is shaped on a case-by-case basis, the exact borderline between non-
recognition and actions amounting to recognition remains undefined. Scholars agree, 
however, that the establishment of full diplomatic relations shall be avoided. This puts 
the EU on the safe side, since not being a state, it cannot formally establish diplomatic 
relations.112  
 
There are no particular mechanisms nor procedures for the NREP. Nevertheless, the 
analysis thereof allows to draw some conclusions on patterns of Brussels’ engagement. 
First, the NREP has been shaped by the Commission and the High Representative and 
is managed mostly by the EU Delegations.113 Although it was suggested that the EUSR 
                                                     
106 EU, 2007 Annual Action Programme for Moldova, Support to Civil Society in Transnistria Action 
Fiche, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enpi_2007_c2007_ 
6294_annual_action_programme_for_moldova_civilsocietytransnistria.pdf, retrieved 
16.04.2020, p. 21. 
107 EU, 2007 Annual Action Programme for Moldova, Confidence-building Measures Action 
Fiche, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enpi_2007_c2007_ 
6294_annual_action_programme_for_moldova_confidencebuildingmeasures.pdf, retrieved 
16.04.2020, p. 3. 
108 European Commission, Evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with Georgia (2007-
2013), vol. 1, 2015, p. 43. 
109 E. Berg & K. Vits, op. cit., p. 400. 
110 European Commission, Evaluation …, p. xix. 
111 E.g. European Commission, Joint statement following the meeting between the European 
Commission and the Government of Georgia, Brussels, 21.05.2014. 
112 J. Ker-Lindsay, “Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with 
contested states”, International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 2, 2015, p. 285.  
113 E. Newman & G. Visoka, op. cit., p. 28; V. Axyonova & A. Gawrich, op. cit., p. 418. 
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for the South Caucasus could play a more prominent role, Brussels delegates the 
implementation tasks to local civil society organisations, while the EUSR or the EU Head 
of Delegation intervene only in the most complex situations.114  
 
Second, as far as the de facto counterparts are concerned, the EU emphasises its 
engagement with local civil society organisations, therefore circumventing as much 
as possible the issue of dealing directly with de facto authorities.115 Should interaction 
with the latter prove necessary, it is preferably informal.116  
 
Third, this engagement has no Treaty or (apart from the case of the Georgian de facto 
states) contractual basis. It is realised mostly via status-neutral projects, funded from 
various EU external assistance instruments.117 For example, the programmes 
implemented in Abkhazia encompass: assistance for the return of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), small agricultural projects, social and economic strengthening of local 
communities, demining or improvement of infrastructure, healthcare and 
education.118  
 
In addition to this, it is also worth mentioning how the EU defines the territorial scope of 
those grants and other projects. Apart from programmes explicitly excluding the 
territories of de facto states, e.g. the Eastern Partnership framework Integrated Border 
Management Flagship Initiative,119 different patterns can be identified:  
1) addressing the programme to the territory of the mother state and limiting its 
immediate application to the territories under its effective control, with a possible 
subsequent extension to de facto states, e.g. SAFE programme;120 
                                                     
114 T. Frear, “The foreign policy options of a small unrecognised state: the case of Abkhazia”, 
Caucasus Survey, vol. 1, no. 2, 2014, p. 91; European Union, Evaluation … op. cit., p. 45. 
115 G. Kyris, “The European Union in Northern Cyprus: Conceptualising the Avoidance of 
Contested States”, Geopolitics, vol. 25, no. 2, 2018, p. 356. 
116 Ibid., p. 9. 
117 European Commission, Evaluation …, op. cit., p. 45. 
118 EU, 2011 Annual Action Programme for Georgia, Support to Conflict Settlement Action Fiche, 
op. cit., pp. 3-4; EU, 2007 Annual Action Programme for Georgia, Economic Rehabilitation 
Action Fiche, op. cit., p. 19; P. Gaprindashvili et al., op. cit., pp. 9-10.  
119 European Commission, Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the ENI East 
Regional Action Programme 2018, retrieved 04.04.2020, p. 1, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2018_3253_f1_annex_en_v2_p1_971039.pdf. 
120 EU4 Safety, Accountability and Fight against Crime in Georgia; European Commission, 
Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2018 in 
favour of Georgia, retrieved 04.04.2020, p. 4, https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-
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2) addressing the programme to the entire territory of the mother state from the 
outset. In this group, several (mutually non-exclusive) patterns can be identified:  
a) Moldova’s ‘joint programmes’ to enhance cooperation between the mother- 
and de facto sate, e.g. EU Support to Confidence Building Measures;121 
b) programmes with special mention of an inclusion of the area of de facto state, 
e.g. the Civil Society Facility for Moldova;122 
c) programmes mentioning actions for the benefit of de facto state as separate 
objectives, e.g. the ENPI Annual Action Programme 2007 for Moldova;123  
d) programmes with particular adjustments regarding the de facto state, e.g. 
refraining from public procurement procedure or granting a separate budget 
for the region, Skills Development and Matching for Labour Market Needs of 
2017, where an amount of 3 750 000 euro is allocated “for specific actions in 
Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia”124, or ENPARD III with a special grant 
“Expansion of rural development measures in Abkhazia”;125 
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programme_for_moldova_confidence_building_measures.pdf. 
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Society Facility (Moldova), retrieved 04.04.2020, p. 1, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/eni_2015_c2015_7150_annual_action_programme_for_moldova_
civilsociety.pdf. 
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Decision on the ENPI Annual Action Programme 2007 in favour of the Republic of Moldova, 
retrieved 04.04.2020, p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ 
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124 European Commission, Annex 2 to Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action 
Programme 2017 for the Republic of Georgia to be financed from the general budget of the 
European Union, retrieved 04.04.2020, p. 1, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
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125 European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. European 
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3) addressing the programme to selected regions within the mother state’s territory, 
including de facto states, particularly often applied in Abkhazia, e.g. a lifelong 
learning skills entrepreneurial learning and entrepreneurship programme started in 
2019;126 
4) conflict-related humanitarian assistance programmes, which through their 
“impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination” (Article 214(2) TEU) constitute a 
particularly interesting illustration of the NREP as they may be addressed directly to 
the populations of de facto states, e.g. the 1998 rehabilitation projects in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia;127 or a 2006 programme for elderly and destitute Abkhazians.128 
They are also rare examples of the EU’s engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Donbas.129 
 
Last but not least, apart from the contribution to long-term peaceful conflict resolution, 
the NREP is designed to limit the de facto states’ dependency on their patrons,130 
namely “to reduce Russia’s strategic leverage over these regions and have a stake in 
the de-escalation of tensions springing from international isolation”.131 For historical 
and geopolitical reasons, the EU’s involvement in the respective peace processes 
varies from case to case.132 “The EU rather than seeking to join these mostly discredited 
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Unrecognized States”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 33, no 4, 2010, p. 71. 
131 E. Newman & G. Visoka, op. cit., p. 21. 
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and deadlocked formats, has been building new frameworks of cooperation in which 
it could bring an added value to the conflict resolution process”.133 For instance, while 
the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) civilian mission was not designed to have 
contact with the separatist republic and has no access to Transnistria, it has gradually 
assumed the tasks of contacting its leadership within the framework of sectoral 
cooperation, workshops organised for both Moldovan and de facto authorities and 
some consultations with the private sector via the Transnistrian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry.134 The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)135 to Georgia, apart from this 
monitoring task, has helped to run the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism 
(IPRM) and a Hotline between the conflicting parties.136 While the latter was designed 
as a subsidiary mechanism enabling parties to have contact on a daily basis, it has 
replaced the suspended IPRM.137 Moreover, the EUMM has recently started minor CBM 
projects.138 
 
This suggests that the EU is generally open to allow its missions to cooperate with the 
respective de facto states even though such an engagement is not always explicitly 
mentioned in the documents constituting the legal basis for its actions. Moreover, 
Brussels proves flexible in adapting to the conditions on the ground and local needs; 
when one of its instruments proves ineffective, its role is taken over by another one. For 
instance, some tasks of the EUSR to South Ossetia were taken over by the EUMM 
Hotline.139 
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Conclusions: the EU’s legal pragmatism  
 
This paper examined how the EU engages with de facto states. The Union’s interaction 
with those ‘unrecognised states’ is shaped by both international and EU law. While the 
international law seems to limit its engagement (e.g. by the obligation to respect the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the mother states or the lack of competence of 
the EU to grant recognition or establish diplomatic relations), the Union has established 
pragmatic ways to interact with the de facto states via shaping the recognition 
practices of its member states, the activity of its Delegations and Special 
Representatives and the NREP, highlighting its adherence to the principles of 
international law in its political statements, jurisprudence and agreements. 
 
Within this arguably tight margins, the EU nevertheless manages to interact with the de 
facto states in a way that does not violate international law. The analysis of its 
statements, jurisprudence, agreements and practice allows to draw some conclusions 
as to the content of the normative framework guiding the EU’s relations with those 
unrecognised republics. First, although the EU itself is not a state and therefore not 
entitled to grant recognition, it often exercises non-recognition allowed by 
international law. In the absence of a consensus on recognition between its members 
states, the EU can only try to convince them to follow its political decisions. 
 
Second, as non-state actors, neither the EU nor the de facto states can establish 
diplomatic relations with each other. However, the mandates of the EU Delegations 
and Special Representatives allow for contact with the authorities of the separatist 
republics when appropriate. The latter are therefore qualified as ‘relevant actors’, but 
by no means is their legal status equated with the one enjoyed by their respective 
mother states. 
 
Third, the Union underlines its adherence to the principles of international law (such as 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity) by issuing statements and declarations referring to de facto states and 
highlighting its support for the rules established in the peace processes regarding 





Fourth, this alignment to international standards can also be seen in the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU which underlines that the agreements concluded between the EU and 
patron states do not cover the separatist territories. The latter are within the scope of 
the agreements with mother states and any suspension of their application due to a 
lack of effective control over the self-proclaimed republics shall be narrowed down as 
much as possible, in order not to jeopardise a future reintegration.  
 
Fifth, Brussels pursues a Non-recognition and Engagement Policy that aims at closing 
the gaps between the mother states aligning to EU standards and their respective 
separatist regions, as well as at building confidence between the two. This is 
implemented mostly via status-neutral projects and by the intermediary of non-
governmental actors on both sides, paying due consideration to the consent of the 
mother states and the subsequent acceptance of the de facto states.  
 
In sum, it can be concluded that the EU, while acting in line with international norms 
and standards, managed to fill this imprecise framework with content in many respects 
much broader than it could be expected. Moreover, the status of non-state actors on 
the international level places the Union on a safe side – despite interacting with the 
self-proclaimed republics, it cannot be accused of an implicit recognition since under 
international law it is not capable to do so. Nevertheless, one shall not forget that 
despite the EU’s effective use of the legal instruments, the actual level of engagement 
depends also on the particularities of the political situation of the de facto states. 
Therefore, the interactions of the EU with Transnistria are much more intense than with 
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Donbas, while Abkhazia may be situated in 
between these two groups.  
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